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Abstract
This article documents a statistical association between the number and success of
venture capital investments and the capital gains tax rate. To do this, we analyze
investment data and taxes of 32 countries from 2000 to 2010. In our data, higher
capital gains tax rates are associated with fewer ﬁrms ﬁnanced and a lower probability
for ventures receiving follow-up funding. However, if the ﬁrst investment is received
when taxes are high, the probability of a ﬁrm eventually going public or being acquired
increases. We conclude that high tax rates are associated with fewer, but on average
more successful companies.
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11 Introduction
Around the world governments introduce programs to promote venture capital and
thus venture capital-ﬁnanced start-up companies.1 These companies are of special
interest for the policy maker, because they are particularly innovative: For example,
a dollar spent on venture capital yielded more than twice as many patents than a
dollar spent on R&D by established companies in the United States over the period
from 1983 to 1992 (Kortum and Lerner 2000).2 Despite this political interest, it
is not completely understood how tax policy — and in particular the capital gains
tax — inﬂuences the investment behaviour of venture capital investors and thus the
entrepreneurial process. Our study intends to ﬁll this gap by measuring the eﬀect of
capital gains taxation on the investment behaviour of venture capital funds.
In the ﬁrst part of our analysis, we estimate the potential eﬀect of the capital gains
tax rate on the number and the success probability of companies receiving their ﬁrst
funding by venture capitalists. We classify a company as successful if it is acquired or
taken public. Our results indicate that an increase in the capital gains tax rate of one
percentage point is associated with 0.90 fewer companies per ten million inhabitants
receiving their ﬁrst investment. This is a reduction of around 2% relative to the mean
of newly ﬁnanced companies. However, the probability of achieving a successful exit
increases after a tax increase. In our data, a one percentage point increase in the
capital gains tax rate is associated with 1.05 percentage points more companies being
acquired or going public. An explanation for this might be a selection eﬀect, as any
statistically signiﬁcant relation of the capital gains tax rate and the total number of
companies being acquired or taken public can not be determined.
In the second part of the analysis, we estimate the potential eﬀect of changes
in the capital gains tax rate on the probability of a venture capital-backed start-
up receiving a follow-up investment. We ﬁnd that (on average) an increase in the
capital gains tax rate of one percentage point is associated with a 2.94 percentage
point lower probability of receving a follow-up investment. At a mean investment
probability of 59% in our sample, such a tax increase reduces the likelihood of a
follow-up investment by around four percent relative to the mean. In contrast, if we
1See for example Lerner (2009), Cumming (2010), ?, and DeGennaro (2010).
2Furthermore, the likelihood of a new product being introduced in the market is three times
higher if a start-up receives venture capital (Hellmann and Puri 2000).
1analyze the potential eﬀect of the capital gains tax rate at the ﬁrst funding round on
the probability that a follow-up funding round takes place, we ﬁnd a positive impact
of the tax rate. A one percentage point increase in this initial capital gains tax rate
leads to a 1.4 percentage point increase in the probability of receving a follow-up
funding round. Taken together, these ﬁndings point again to the selection eﬀect of
taxes, i.e. that high tax rates lead to the ﬁnancing of fewer, but on average more
successful companies.
To estimate the eﬀect of the capital gains tax on venture capital investment, we
match all recorded funding rounds in the Thomson One database (formerly known
as VentureXpert) with the capital gains tax rates in 32 diﬀerent countries from 2000
to 2010. We thus obtain an unbalanced panel of 27,219 companies in 32 diﬀerent
countries with a total of 58,228 funding rounds. In the ﬁrst part of our analysis we
use a weighted OLS with year-ﬁxed eﬀects. In the second part, we employ a ﬁrm-
ﬁxed eﬀect models with year, stage, and round-ﬁxed eﬀects. As robustness we also
use a simple OLS model with country and industry-ﬁxed eﬀects instead of ﬁrm-ﬁxed
eﬀects. All standard errors are clustered on the country level as taxes are serially
correlated within a country.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study analyzing the eﬀect of taxes
on the probability of venture capital funds to invest into start-ups. In particular, we
explicitly consider the eﬀect of taxes on the number of ﬁrst round investments, on the
start-up’s probability of receiving a follow-up funding round, and on the probability
of achieving a successful exit. Thus, we are able to trace the inﬂuence of taxes on
ventures over the whole investment cycle from inception to the venture capitalist’s
exit. 3 Furthermore, the employed method of a ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression has
not been applied to the study of venture capital before. This is an improvement on
prior work as we can better control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity compared to previ-
ous studies using country-ﬁxed eﬀects. As our study newly assesses the impact of the
capital gains tax on the creation and the probability of continuous ﬁnancial support
for venture capital-backed companies, it suggests implications to policy makers on
how to enhance the success of new ventures.
3The probability of receiving a follow-up investment has been used as an outcome variable before:
For example, Townsend (2010) used in a recent article a hazard rate model to estimate the eﬀect of
the burst of the tech-bubble on the chance of obtaining a follow-up investment.
2The idea of considering the eﬀect of macro and industry conditions on the invest-
ment in the ﬁrst funding round and on the probability of success is not new. Most
closely related to our paper is Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008).
They study the eﬀect of the market-to-book ratio on a venture capital fund’s number
of investments in newly created companies and their success probability in a given
industry. As we do, they consider the rate to achieve a successful exit as a dependent
variable. An outcome of their analysis is that venture capitalists with especially high
industry experience have a higher rate of achieving a successful exit. Another related
study is Brander, Du, and Hellmann (2010) who use a similiar dataset as we do to
analyze the inﬂuence of government supported venture capitalists on the probability
of venture capital funds realizing a successful exit with their portfolio companies.
They ﬁnd that a moderate participation of government support is helpful toward
venture capital funding outperforming their competitors, while too much government
participation is harmful.4
Several other studies consider the eﬀect of taxes on the volume of venture capital
committed in a certain country and year. In general, they ﬁnd a negative impact
of taxes on the supply of risk capital or the total volume invested in a country
(Poterba 1987, Poterba 1989b, Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998, Da Rin,
Nicodano, and Sembenelli 2006, Bonini and Alkan 2009). Our study adds to their
ﬁndings by analyzing the investment decision of the venture capitalist explicitly and
not the overall volume invested by a venture capital fund or in a country. Therefore,
we consider the investments into start-ups via several funding rounds over the whole
investment cycle, which cannot be determined by looking at invested volumes alone.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the
institutional set-up and the proposed causal channel of the capital gains tax on ven-
ture capitalists’ investment decisions. In section 3 we discuss our data construction.
The empirical speciﬁcation and the results can be found in section 4. In section 5,
we conduct robustness checks on our results and section 6 concludes.
4Other articles considering the success probability as a dependent variable are Gompers and
Lerner (2000) and Amit, Brander, and Antweiler (2002).
32 Theoretical background
We want to assess how the capital gains tax inﬂuences the creation and the survival
of venture capital-backed companies. Venture capital funds are often the only possi-
ble source of funding for young high risk (and often high tech) companies (Elango,
Fried, Hisrich, and Polonchek 1995, Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998).5
For such start-up companies, traditional bank ﬁnancing is unavailable, because they
do not have assets which can be pledged as collateral. Instead of demanding col-
lateral, a venture capital fund monitors these start-ups intensively after investing
so that the risk of exploitation of private beneﬁts is reduced and entrepreneurial
eﬀort is enforced (Becker and Hellmann 2003, Kaplan and Strömberg 2004, Gom-
pers, Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998). The monitoring eﬀort renders investments
more costly for the venture capitalist limiting the possibility of investing in numerous
start-ups simultaneously (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). As a consequence, ventures
with high monitoring eﬀorts face ﬁnancing constraints (Elango, Fried, Hisrich, and
Polonchek 1995, Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998). Nevertheless, these
start-ups might contribute to innovation and become growth companies. Therefore,
the provision of venture capital to young and innovative companies is often desired
from a political point of view. As monitoring costs can hardly be inﬂuenced, govern-
ments try to use diﬀerent policy measures to increase the returns of venture capital
investments (Bonini and Alkan 2009). Tax policy is the most direct way of increas-
ing the venture capitalist’s return, as the capital gains tax directly reduces the sales
price of ﬁrms when investments are exited (Poterba 1989a, Poterba 1989b, Gompers,
Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998).
In order to improve their bargaining position in the monitoring process, venture
capitalists do not invest the required funds all at once but provide them in consecutive
funding rounds. A successful start-up usually receives several funding rounds before
it is acquired or taken public. In our data, companies have on average 1.81 funding
rounds. That means that after a certain period of time venture capitalists assess
whether they continue investing, depending on the expected net present value of
the investment in a start-up company. The investment in a start-up is proﬁtable,
if the investor is able to sell the acquired share of the company with a proﬁt. The
5We use ventures, start-ups, and companies interchangeably throughout the paper.
4most proﬁtable exit route is to sell the new ﬁrm either to the public in an initial
public oﬀering (IPO) or to an established company in a trade sale. Cochrane (2005)
estimates that if a ﬁrm is acquired or taken public, it delivers to the investor an
arithmetic return of 698% with a standard deviation (std) of 3,282%.
In our analysis we consider the investment decisions of a representative venture
capitalist who aims to achieve a minimum return on the investment. The venture
capitalist closes a funding round for the venture if the expected gains from the invest-
ment, i.e. the expected sales price net of taxes less the expected costs associated with
the investment, are high enough that the required return is met or exceeded.6 Thus,
the probability of venture capitalists providing funding to young companies rises if
tax policy is designed in such a way that the venture capitalists’ potential returns are
high.
The capital gains tax is often considered to be the most decisive tax in the con-
text of venture capital investments as it is levied on the diﬀerence between the sales
price and the amount invested. This directly reduces the investor’s return and thus
the venture capitalist’s incentive to invest in, to support, and to monitor the venture
(Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004). Therefore, higher capital gains taxes are supposed to
reduce the number of start-ups that receive venture capital ﬁnancing and the proba-
bility that entrepreneurial companies receive subsequent funding rounds (Keuschnigg
and Nielsen 2001, Becker and Hellmann 2003, Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004). In ad-
dition, capital gains taxes might also have an eﬀect on the quality of ventures that
are ﬁnanced. If tax rates are high, venture capitalists will diligently decide about
which start-ups will be ﬁnanced in the ﬁrst place. As a consequence, high capital
gains taxes might lead to venture capitalists picking potentially more successful com-
panies.7 Gordon (1998) proves this for personal tax rates and ﬁnds that the survival
rate of newly founded companies is low if personal tax rates are too low. He as-
cribes this eﬀect to eﬃciency losses as too many start-ups - not just promising ones
- are funded in the case of low tax rates. For our analysis, we consider the individ-
6The minimum rate of return is the so-called hurdle rate. It also covers the cost and expenditure
associated with the investment. Among other factors, this minimum return is inﬂuenced by the
risk-free return rate and the capital gains tax rate that would have to be paid on the return. Nanda
and Rhodes-Kropf (2011) use a similar thought model for Venture Capital to explain innovation
waves.
7Such selection eﬀects are extensively described in the heterogenous ﬁrm literature started by
Melitz (2003).
5ual capital gains tax rates as these are usually eﬀectively relevant for the individual
venture capitalists. This is especially the case when venture capital funds underly a
transparent taxation.
Prior studies use the investment volumes of venture capital as the dependent
variable for analyzing tax policy, implicitly focusing on the incentive of the venture
capitalist to do fundraising and of the limited partners to provide funds (Gompers,
Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998, Jeng and Wells 2000, Bonini and Alkan 2009). This
makes sense as the raising of funds is a prerequisite for venture capital investments.
However, size alone is not a satisfactory measure of the contribution of venture capital
markets to the ﬁnancing of new companies, as no direct conclusion can be drawn on
how many ﬁrms are created and if they persist in the market (Da Rin, Nicodano, and
Sembenelli 2006). In our study we focus on the net-eﬀect of taxes on the number of
new venture capital-ﬁnanced ventures and their survival probability, whether this is
associated with more or less capital committed.
3 Data and Variable Construction
For our dataset we collected tax data for 32 countries from 2000 to 2010 and matched
it with venture capital investments in these countries during the same period. Data
on the individual capital gains tax rates in each year and country was obtained from
the Ernst&Young “Global Executive” tax guides and the tax handbooks published by
the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). The individual (instead of
the corporate) capital gains tax rate is used because usually “transparent” taxation
applies to venture capital funds. That means that venture capitalists’ capital gains
are taxed on the individual level even if the investments are executed via funds. The
capital gains tax rate is determined for an investor who holds a substantial stake in
a company and does not sell his or her shares for an extended time period. We use
the tax rate applicable to individuals in the highest income bracket. If there is a
dedicated capital gains tax relief for venture capital investors, such as the “relief on
disposal for a business” for a venture capital trust in the United Kindom, we assume
it applies. The evolution of the individual capital gains tax is depicted in Figure 1.
The tax data is matched with venture capital investments from the Thomson One
database over the same period. Our dataset contains information on consecutive
6Figure 1: Evolution of the capital gains tax rates over time
funding rounds for a large sample of venture capital-ﬁnanced companies with name,
country, founding date, date of investment round, round description, and the ﬁnal
company status from the Private Equity module of the Thomson One database pub-
lished by Thomson Reuters.8 To focus exclusively on venture capital investments,
we select all rounds which bear relation to venture capital, such as “Seed”, “Early
Stage”, “Expansion”, or “Later Stage”. Rounds whose description indicates a rela-
tionship with private equity (e.g. “MBO” “LBO”, “Bridge Loan”, etc.) are deleted.
Additionally, we restrict our dataset to companies that received their ﬁrst investment
after 1999 as the Thomson One database has a good international coverage only after
this date (Brander, Du, and Hellmann 2010).
In order to be able to analyze the number and the percentage of successful ﬁrms,
we have to deﬁne “success”. We use a classiﬁcation based on the exit type of a com-
pany, because exit types are highly correlated with returns resulting from a venture
capital investment (Phalippou and Gottschalg 2009). The following Thomson One
exit types for the investee company are classiﬁed as successful: acquisition, pending
acquisition, merger, in registration for an IPO, and those that went public. If an
investee company is defunct or bankrupt, it is regarded as a failure. Active compa-
nies are evaluated as failures in this context as well. This classiﬁcation is common in
venture capital research and similiar to the one used by Gompers, Kovner, Lerner,
and Scharfstein (2008).9
8The total investment amount of one round is usually provided by several venture capitalists. If
this is the case, these investments are aggregated to one round. Funding rounds do not necessarily
correspond to the development stages of the company, i.e. a start-up can have several funding
rounds during its “Early Stage”.
9According to their data description Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008) do not
7In the ﬁrst part of our analysis we estimate the eﬀect of the capital gains tax
on the number of ﬁrms receiving their ﬁrst investment, on the number, and on the
percentage of successful ﬁrms. In order to do this, we count the absolute number
of ﬁrms receiving their ﬁrst investment per 10 million inhabitants and the number
of successful ﬁrms in each country-year combination. Dividing these two numbers
delivers the percentage of successful ﬁrms. We match these variables with the tax
rates in the year before the funding round took place. This is the same timing
assumption as in Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008). Finally, we
aggregate our data on the country-year level, because the capital gains tax rate does
not vary below this level. The summary statistics for all employed variables in this
ﬁrst dataset are given in Table 1 and Figure 2 depicts the evolution of our dependent
variables over time.
Table 1: Summary statistics for the number of ﬁrms analysis
mean sd min max p10 p90
# Firms 27.45 44.25 0.00 533.52 0.09 64.50
# Success 3.93 8.79 0.00 91.68 0.00 10.21
% Success 12.78 15.70 0.00 100.00 0.00 29.59
Capital Gains Tax 19.43 11.23 0.00 50.00 0.00 30.00
Observations 321
In the second part of the analysis we estimate the eﬀect of the capital gains
tax on the probability of a venture capital-backed company receiving a follow-up
investment round. Our dependent variable, Investment, is a dummy which indicates
for every investment round whether there was a subsequent funding round or whether
the venture capitalist realized a successful exit.10 If this is the case, the variable is
set equal to one and to zero otherwise. This dummy is matched with the capital
gains tax rate at the date of the current round. Figure 3 shows the evolution of
probabilities of re-investment over time. Our data does not contain the exact date
when the investment decision is taken. We only know that the decision date is after
the current round date and before the date of the next round. In order to make
include the category “pending acquisition” as a successful exit. However, it seems reasonable to
include it, since “in registration for an IPO” is also included. A similar classiﬁcation is used by
other authors (Hochberg and Lu 2007, Brander, Du, and Hellmann 2010). These articles exclude
“mergers” from succcesful exits. Our results are robust to excluding this exit type.
10In the Appendix, we re-estimate our regressions by only including subsequent funding rounds
and receive the same results.
8Figure 2: Evolution of the dependent variables over time
(a) Number of ﬁrms (b) Success probability
(c) Number of successful ﬁrms
no arbitrary assumptions on the decision point in time, we use the tax rate at the
current round date.11
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for our second dataset. In total, our dataset
comprises 58,228 funding rounds of 27,219 companies in 32 diﬀerent countries from
2000 to 2010. Table 4 lists the countries and the number of companies in our dataset.
The variables are described in Table 3.
11We show the robustness of our results with regard to the timing of the capital gains tax rate in
the Appendix.
9Table 2: Summary statistics for the re-investment probability analysis
mean sd min max p10 p90
Investment 63.29 48.20 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
Capital Gains Tax 18.89 6.29 0.00 45.00 15.00 26.40
Round Duration (days) 400.18 352.79 1.00 3803.00 88.00 817.00
# Rounds 2.12 1.82 1.00 20.00 1.00 4.00
Observations 58228
Table 3: Data description
Variable Description
Capital Gains Tax Capital gains tax rate applicable to individuals in the highest
income bracket.
# Firms Count of the number of ﬁrms receiving the ﬁrst investment round
per ten million inhabitants.
% Success Percentage of successful ﬁrms receiving their ﬁrst funding in a
speciﬁc country and year. A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as successful if it is
acquired or taken public.
# Success Count of number of successful ﬁrms per ten million inhabitants
in a country. A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as successful if it is acquired or
taken public.
Investment Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company obtains a follow-up
round or is exited successfully. A successful exit is deﬁned by a
trade sale or the company going public.
Quality Residual of a regression of the probability of investment on the
capital gains tax rate, ﬁrm, and year-ﬁxed eﬀects.
10Table 4: Country and Number of Firms
# ﬁrms Percent
USA 14,217 52.23























New Zealand 38 0.14
Luxembourg 30 0.11







11Figure 3: Evolution of the investment probability over time
(a) for diﬀerent countries (b) for diﬀerent stages in the US
4 Empirical speciﬁcation and Results
4.1 The impact of capital gains taxes on the ﬁrst investment
round
We ﬁrst look at the potential eﬀect of the capital gains tax on the number of ﬁrms
funded before turning to its inﬂuence on the proportion and the number of successful
ﬁrms. Our econometric model is
y = β · Lagged Capital Gains Tax + Controls + ￿ (1)
where y is the number of ﬁrms receiving their ﬁrst funding per ten million inhab-
itants in a country, the proportion, or the number of successful companies. In all
speciﬁcations we use a constant, country, and year ﬁxed-eﬀects as controls. The
country dummies take up the eﬀect of constant unobserved country-speciﬁc factors
that might be correlated with the tax rates and thus bias our estimates. Such factors
might include e.g. the quality of the university system and the general entrepreneurial
attitude. A full set of year dummies controls in a nonparametric way for a potential
time trend in both regressions. In the next Section 5, we explore speciﬁcations with
time-trends and additional control variables and receive the same results.
In the following, we discuss the potential eﬀect of a change in the capital gains tax
rate on the number of ﬁrms per capita, the proportion, and the number of successful
companies per capita. Table 5 reports OLS regressions for equation 1. Throughout
the analyses, all standard errors are clustered on the country level to account for the
12Table 5: The impact of the capital gains tax on the ﬁrst investment round
The sample consists of yearly observations with one observation per country and year for 2000
to 2010, inclusively. The dependent variable in the ﬁrst column is the number of companies
receiving their ﬁrst funding per ten million inhabitants. In the second and third regression it is the
proportion of successful ﬁrms and the number of succesful ﬁrms per ten million inhabitants. A ﬁrm
is successful if it is eventually acquired or taken public. The independent variables in all regressions
below are the capital gains tax rate in year t-1, country, and year dummies. Please refer to the
text for the construction of these variables and the data sources. The estimation method in all
regressions is ordinary least squares. All regressions are weighted: In the ﬁrst and third regression
we use the population size as analytic weights. In the second column the number of companies serve
as weights. In all speciﬁcations the standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered on the
country level. ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
# Firms % Success # Success
Lagged Capital Gains Tax -0.90∗∗ 1.05∗∗ -0.01
(0.40) (0.41) (0.35)
Year Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes
Model OLS OLS OLS
adj. R2 0.70 0.88 0.59
Number of Observations 321 290 321
correlation of tax rates within a country over time (Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan
2004). In the ﬁrst and third column the observations are weighted with the population
size of the country. In the second column we use the number of companies receiving
their ﬁrst funding as weights.
Column (1) shows an estimated coeﬃcient of -0.90 (s.e.=0.4) for the potential
impact of the capital gains tax rate on the number of ﬁrms that receive venture
capital. This suggests that an increase in the capital gains tax rate by one percentage
point leads to about 0.90 fewer ﬁnanced companies per ten million inhabitants. In
particular, according to this estimates, a one percentage point tax increase in the
U.S. with a population of 309 million in 2010 leads to a reduction of 27.8 companies
receiving their ﬁrst funding. This is a reduction of about 2.15% relative to the average
of 1,292 companies receiving funding in the U.S. per year over our sample period. One
possible interpretation of these ﬁndings is that venture capitalists invest less when
capital gains taxes are high. This would be in line with the theoretical predictions of
Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001) and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004) and the empirical
ﬁndings of Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006). As Thomson One often does
13not report investment volumes of funding rounds and — if they are reported — sizes
are estimated, we cannot assess whether capital gains taxes have an impact on the
actual investment volume per company. Another possible interpretation of the results
is that investee companies are selected more critically when capital gains tax rates
are high as the venture capitalist’s required return before taxes is higher which leads
to fewer ﬁnanced ventures.
In column (2) we estimate the potential eﬀect of taxes and the proportion of
successful companies. According to the reported results, increasing the capital gains
tax rate by one percentage point is associated with a 1.05 percentage point higher
probability of achieving a successful exit. The average probability of exiting an in-
vestment via an initial public oﬀering or an aquisition is around 22.3% for the USA
in our sample. Therefore a one percentage point tax increase leads to a 5% increase
in the probability of realizing a successful exit relative to the mean. One possible
explanation for this ﬁnding might be that when capital gains tax rates are high, ven-
ture capitalists use a stricter due diligence process to evaluate in which companies to
invest. This means with high taxes, only the most promising ventures are ﬁnanced.
A second possibility is that the eﬀort of the entrepreneur or the venture capitalist
increases due to the tax change which renders ﬁnanced ﬁrms more successful. We
cannot conclusively tell whether the ﬁrst or the second hypothesis applies. However,
if tax changes improve the venture capitalist’s or the entrepreneur’s incentives to
perform, we should be able to measure an increase in the number of successful ﬁrms
with increasing tax rates.
This eﬀect, however, cannot be approved. According to the estimates in column
(3) we do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the capital gains tax rate on
the number of successful companies over the whole sample period. The mean estimate
is small and negative, but insigniﬁcant. Taking the results in columns (2) and (3)
together, our ﬁndings are in line with the possibility that a more successful selection
of funded companies takes place with higher capital gains tax rates. Higher tax rates
might therefore lead to a sorting on productivity in the market as in Melitz (2003).
Furthermore, these results are in line with the supposition that venture capitalists are
already able to pick ﬁrms for which an successful exit is probable at the time of the
ﬁrst investment. However, the results do not imply that higher capital gains tax rates
14are advisable. We have a large number of companies in our data that are classiﬁed as
“active” according to Thomson One, which are regarded as failures according to our
classiﬁcation, although they might still exist in the market and create jobs. However,
an increase in the capital gains tax rate might result in fewer of these companies.
We cannot exhaustively determine whether our results can be interpreted causally.
The estimated regressions identify the causal eﬀect of taxes only if the tax rates
are not caused by some other time varying left-out variable that also inﬂuences the
number of companies receiving their ﬁrst investment. This seems plausible as we
use the general capital gains tax rate which might be exogenous to decisions in the
entrepreneurial sector. If taxes are, for example, raised to reduce a government deﬁcit,
it is unlikely that they are accompanied by other measures changing new company
creation. In other cases this assumption might be more problematic: If a newly
elected policy maker is interested in fostering entrepreneurship, he or she might lower
taxes and at the same time reduce regulation or increase support mechanisms to
entrepreneurship. This being the case, we cannot distinguish the eﬀect of the change
in the capital gains tax from the latter two measures. Generally, we have problems
with identiﬁcation if tax changes are embedded in synchronized programs to help or
harm the entrepreneurial sector. In this case, our coeﬃcients estimate the eﬀect of
the combined measures. Nevertheless, we think that even in that case such a statistic
is of interest to the policy maker in its own right.
4.2 The impact of the capital gains tax on follow-up funding
rounds
In order to appraise the potential eﬀect of the capital gains tax rate on follow up
funding rounds, we estimate four diﬀerent equations. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we
regress the capital gains tax rate on an indicator that takes a value of one if the
company under consideration receives a subsequent funding round or manages a suc-
cessful exit (and zero otherwise). The controls include a constant, ﬁrm, year, round,
and investment stage-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Investment = β · Capital Gains Tax + µ + Controls + ￿ (2)
As we potentially observe repeated investments in the same company, it is possible
to use ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects to control for time-invariant characteristics of the ﬁrm such as
15the quality of the business idea or a key technology (Kaplan, Sensoy, and Strömberg
2009). The company’s quality might e.g. be positively correlated with the tax burden
and bias our estimates when left out. By using this method, we lose all ﬁrms with
only one investment round. Therefore, we estimate in the second speciﬁcation an
OLS with country-ﬁxed eﬀects.12
In the third speciﬁcation we drop the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect but control additionally for
the capital gains tax rate a year before the ﬁrst funding (initial capital gains tax).
The reason is that a higher tax burden at the company’s inception might lead to a
selection based on quality and therefore also to a higher probability of investment in
follow-up funding rounds. In the fourth speciﬁcation, we ﬁrst estimate speciﬁcation 2
and then calculate the residual, which contains the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect µ. This residual
captures factors such as the quality of the ﬁrm. For simplicity, we call this residual
Quality = µ + ￿ in the following, being aware that other factors might be subsumed
in this measure as well. By dropping all but the ﬁrst investment round, we can
regress this residual on the initial capital gains tax rate and on country, year, and
industry-ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, we control for the year of the ﬁrst funding.
In table 6 we report the results of all four speciﬁcations. In column (1) we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence of the capital gains tax on the probability of receiving
another investment at the 1% level. The mean estimate implies that a one percentage
point tax increase is associated with a 2.94 percentage points lower probability of re-
ceiving another funding round. With an average re-investment probability of 63.29%
in our sample, such a tax increase might lead to a likelihood reduced by 4.64% of
receiving another investment relative to the mean. In the second column, we rees-
timate our model with an OLS. The mean estimate is smaller but still signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. These ﬁndings imply that an increase in the
capital gains tax rate potentially reduces the re-investment incentives in established
companies and not only in new ﬁrms.
In column (3) we use an OLS model to explain the probability of receiving a
follow-up funding round with the capital gains tax at the current round date and with
the capital gains tax in force a year before the ﬁrst round. The eﬀects concerning
12Unfortunately, we cannot include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects together with country- and industry-ﬁxed
eﬀects in the same regression. No ﬁrm in our data changes the industry or the country. Consequently,
country and industry-ﬁxed eﬀects are perfectly collinear with the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects and not separately
identiﬁed.
16Table 6: The eﬀect of taxes on the probability of receiving a follow-up investment
The unit of observation is a funding round of a venture capital-backed company. The dependent
variable is a dummy that is one if the company under consideration receives a subsequent investment
round, goes public, or is acquired. Otherwise the dummy is zero. The “Capital Gains Tax” is the
individual capital gains tax rate at the current round. The “Initial Capital Gains Tax” is the capital
gains tax rate in eﬀect a year before the ﬁrst investment round. We include year, stage, round,
country, industry, and ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects as controls. In the last three speciﬁcations we substitute
the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects by dummies for the country and the industry and use an OLS as an estimation
method. The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered on country level. ***, **, *
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment Investment Investment Quality
Capital Gains Tax -2.94∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗ -2.27∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.41) (0.34)
Initial Capital Gains Tax 1.40∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.28)
Year Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes No No
Country Fixed Eﬀect No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀect No Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes No No No
Model FE OLS OLS OLS
Adj. R-squared 0.353 0.241 0.222 0.290
Number of Observations 58228 58228 55614 26719
17the capital gains tax rate at the current round date remain virtually unchanged to
speciﬁcations (1) and (2). Additionally, we ﬁnd that a one percentage point higher
capital gains tax rate in force a year before the ﬁrst round is associated with a
1.40 percentage points higher probability of investment on average in every follow-up
round.13 This indicates that a higher tax burden at the time of the ﬁrst investment
might lead to an increased survival probability in the investment cycle. The ﬁndings
in column (3) are corroborated in column (4). In this speciﬁcation we correlate the
ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect with the initial capital gains tax rate. The results indicate that a
higher initial tax rate appears to increase the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects of the ﬁrm. This
might be due to an increase in the ﬁrm quality.14
Taken together, these ﬁndings are in line with the results of the last section: On
the one hand, higher capital gains tax rates appear to be associated with a lower
willingness of venture capitalists to provide further funding. On the other hand, a
higher tax burden at the time of the ﬁrst funding seems to entail investments in
companies for which a successful exit is more probable. Again these ﬁndings are in
line with a selection eﬀect of taxes: If returns are reduced by a high tax burden,
venture capital funds do not ﬁnance ﬁrms with a low success probability. This eﬀect
reduces the absolute number of investments but increases the average probability of
success of a company given it receives funding.
Our estimates show the causal eﬀect of capital gains tax rates only if nothing else
changes (at the same time) taxes, the probability of investment, and the company’s
quality. As already noted above, this assumption is dubious if the tax changes are
embedded in programs targeted at increasing or decreasing entrepreneurship. How-
ever, in this regression the potential endogeneity problem is less severe than in the
analysis of the last section, because we consider only companies that already received
an investment. These companies, especially in later stages, do not rely much on
subsidies such as incubators, start-up loans, or coaching provided by state-sponsored
programs.
13Note that we do not control for the funding round number in speciﬁcation (3). The funding
round number a company is able to achieve is an outcome of the quality of the company and therefore
should not be used as an explantory variable if we want to ﬁnd the determinants of ﬁrm quality. In
an unreported regression we ﬁnd that the funding round number is highly correlated with the initial
capital gains tax rate.
14It is possible that we underestimate the standard errors in this regression because we do not
correct for the additional variance of the estimated dependent variable.
185 Robustness
A major concern regarding the robustness of our results is the considered time-span.
The dot-com bubble reached its peak in March 2000 and deﬂated during 2001. At
the end of our sample period in 2008 to 2010, the ﬁnancial crisis set in. If, for
example, during such a crisis the government introduced a series of measures to
help the entrepreneurial sector and a tax change happened at the same time, our
estimates might wrongly reﬂect the overall eﬀect of these measures and not only of
the tax change. But if this is not the case, we might lose information by restricting
our sample.
In order to show the robustness of our results, we repeat our regressions with
diﬀerent time-spans. Table 7 and Table 8 show the results. In the ﬁrst three columns
of both tables we exclude the tech-bubble years and in the next three columns we
exclude the ﬁnancial crisis. The last three columns use a sample from 2002 to 2008
without any crisis. The results from the main section appear to be stable: the mean
estimates of all coeﬃcients in both tables are of a similar magnitude and the results
remain statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level. The only exception is the
eﬀect of taxes on the percentage of successful ﬁrms if only the years 2000 to 2008
(column (5) in Table 7) are considered. The estimated coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero and its estimated size is about half compared to the full sample.
One reason for this result might be that our sample is blurred when including the
dot-com bubble, during which successful exits were not possible for many companies,
and when excluding the ﬁnancial crisis.
Another concern is that the changes in tax rates pick up the eﬀect of a trend
or of correlated variables. In order to control for cofounding factors, we use three
diﬀerent sets of control variables in Table 9 and Table 10 : The “Market” set includes
the market-to-book-ratio of the complete market and technology stocks (Gompers,
Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein 2008). The “Taxes” set includes personal and cor-
porate income taxes. These two sets, together with GDP and GDP growth, the total
R&D spending in a country per capita, the R&D spending on higher education, gov-
ernment ﬁnanced bussiness R&D, the average amount of funding in the last round,
and the received funding per person is the “All” set of control variables.15 In Table
15All estimated coeﬃcients are available from the authors, but are left out here for conciseness.
1911 and Table 12 we substitute the year-ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁrst with an overall and then
with a country-speciﬁc linear and quadratic time-trend.
The estimates are in line with our ﬁndings in the results section as the same coef-
ﬁcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and have the expected magnitude. There
are three exceptions: First, the negative eﬀect of the capital gains tax on the invest-
ment probability while controlling for the initial capital gains tax is much smaller
and has only a p-value of 11.6%. Second, there is no eﬀect of taxes on the percentage
of successful companies if we control for all variables (9, column (6)). Third, with a
country-speciﬁc linear and quadratic time-trend the negative eﬀect on the number of
ﬁrms is not signiﬁcant due to a larger standard-error (11, column (4)). This might
be due to the selection of countries-years for which all controls are available. Rees-
timating it on the same sample without controls delivers an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
estimate, too.
Please note that the number of observations is reduced due to not all variables being available for






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This study oﬀers a new view on the eﬀect of the capital gains tax in the entrepreneurial
process. We document an empirical association between the capital gains tax and the
number and success of venture capital investment. The inﬂuence of the capital gains
tax can be separated into its eﬀect on the propensity to invest and on the probability
of the venture capital-backed start-up achieving a successful exit. Our results indicate
that higher capital gains tax rates potentially lead to a reduction in the number of
companies receiving their ﬁrst investment and to a lower probability of receiving a
follow-up investment. In contrast to that, high capital gains tax rates at the time
of the ﬁrst funding are associated with a higher probability of receiving follow-up
funding and eventually being acquired or going public. Therefore, high tax rates are
correlated with fewer ﬁnanced but — on average — more successful ﬁrms. Our results
imply hence that policy makers can indeed inﬂuence entrepreneurial activities by tax
policy. It does not mean, however, that policy makers should raise tax rates in order
to improve the funding of successful ventures. First of all, we have a high number of
companies in our database, that are classiﬁed as “active” according to Thomson One.
These companies might not be successfully acquired or taken public, but several of
them can nevertheless contribute to innovation and create jobs. Second, the general
number of companies funded is reduced by high capital gains taxes which decreases
proportionally the absolute number of potentially successful ventures.
Besides, our study might contribute empirical evidence to the ongoing policy
discussion on the taxation of carried interest in the U.S. which started in the early
2000s. The aim of diﬀerent legislative proposals was to increase the taxation of carried
interest, a variable compensation for general partners of venture capital funds, from
15% on capital gains to the level of 39% on ordinary income. In many other countries
similar discussions followed. Our ﬁndings imply that on the one hand, such a tax
increase can heavily reduce the number of companies ﬁnanced by venture capital
and harm the probability of existing companies receiving a follow-up funding round.
On the other hand, such a tax increase might cause a potentially desirable selection
eﬀect, by raising the number of companies which eventually lead to a successful exit
like an IPO or a trade sale.
We do not have data on the diﬀerential classiﬁcation of certain investment returns
24for general partners of venture capital funds, as either capital gains or income, in order
to further breakdown the eﬀect of the capital gains tax rate and to give a quantitative
eﬀect of the estimated eﬀect. In addition, our estimate constitutes a combination of
the eﬀect of the capital gains tax on the decision of entrepreneurs, venture capitalists,
and limited partners. Therefore, we cannot isolate the cause of the eﬀect on any
single one of these groups and ascribe it to one special tax treatment. However, when
stakes in ventures are sold either by the venture capitalist or the entrepreneur himself,
capital gains taxes will be due. Even if some venture capitalists might be tax exempt
- which might be the case in the U.S. - they would as well favor a lower capital gains
taxation so that exit possibilities are alleviated as entrepreneurs would then have to
pay lower taxes. Thus, our results might be a reasonable approximation of the eﬀects
a proposed tax increase for carried interest could have. Besides, high capital gains
taxes reduce the number of generally venture capital-ﬁnanced companies which might
harm the innovation in economies.
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7 Appendix
This section contains additional robustness checks for the methods used in the results
section. First, we change the timing of our policy interventions. In the main text
we use the tax rate for the year before the actual funding decision is taken. This is
the timing assumption of Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008). More
precisely, we use the tax rate for the year before the ﬁrst funding for the ﬁrst invest-
ment. For the follow-up investment we use the tax rate at the current round date.
In Table 7 and Table 8 we change the timing by lagging and forwarding the tax rates
one year relative to the timing in the main text. Therefore, we consider the tax rates
two years before the decision (-1) and in the year after the decision (+1) for the ﬁrst
funding round. We expect that our estimates should be relatively insensitive to the
exact timing because taxes are serially correlated.
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant
if we measure the tax rate at the date of the decision. The results are more nuanced
if we consider the tax rates two years before the decision: there is no eﬀect on the
number of ﬁrms receiving their ﬁrst funding. The mean estimate of the coeﬃcient
even has a positive sign but with large standard errors. If we restrict the sample
to the years after 2000, the sign becomes again signiﬁcantly negative. Therefore, it
might be explained by the number of ﬁrms which decreased in the aftermath of the
tech-bubble. The coeﬃcient is also negative if we estimate an unweighted regression,
thus giving the U.S. a smaller weight. All other results are as expected.
Another concern is, that the weighing scheme might inﬂuence our results: In the
main text we use weighted regressions in the ﬁrst round because some observations
are more informative than others. The percentage of successful companies has e.g.
more information for the U.S. as our sample contains many companies of this country
whereas it contains less for e.g. Slovenia. If we give all observations equal weights
as we do in Table 15, the coeﬃcients on the percentage of successful ﬁrms is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero anymore. Apparently, countries with few companies
add noise, if we do not do weighted regressions. If we restrict our sample to the
2915 countries which have on average 10 or more (column (4)) or 20 or more (column
(5)) companies per 10 million inhabitants receiving their ﬁrst funding, the results are
again signiﬁcant.
Finally, a concern which was expressed to us is that by classifying a successful
exit as a follow-up investment, we might bias our results. In Table 16 we delete
the last round of every company which achieved a successful exit. Therefore, the
resulting dataset consists only of re-investment decisions for successful ﬁrms. On the
ﬂip-side, for unsuccessful ﬁrms we do not know whether the last funding decision was
really an incorrect decision to re-invest or the decision to not exit the investment.
The results that we get with this modiﬁcation are similar to the one reported in the
results section.
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0
.
3
3
)
(
0
.
4
2
)
M
o
d
e
l
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
3
2
1
2
9
0
3
2
1
3
1
5
2
8
4
3
1
5
T
a
b
l
e
1
4
:
C
h
a
n
g
i
n
g
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
:
T
h
e
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
t
a
x
e
s
o
n
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
r
o
u
n
d
s
W
e
r
e
p
e
a
t
t
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
c
h
a
n
g
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
I
f
a
(
+
1
)
i
s
a
d
d
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
n
a
m
e
,
t
h
i
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
a
y
e
a
r
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
r
o
u
n
d
.
W
i
t
h
a
(
-
1
)
w
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
a
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
t
w
o
y
e
a
r
s
b
e
f
o
r
e
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
r
o
u
n
d
a
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
o
n
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
t
h
e
m
a
i
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
G
a
i
n
s
T
a
x
(
-
1
)
-
2
.
6
5
∗
∗
∗
-
1
.
9
3
∗
∗
∗
(
0
.
5
5
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
G
a
i
n
s
T
a
x
(
+
1
)
-
3
.
0
4
∗
∗
∗
-
2
.
0
7
∗
∗
∗
(
0
.
5
4
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
G
a
i
n
s
T
a
x
(
-
1
)
0
.
5
6
∗
∗
0
.
2
3
(
0
.
2
1
)
(
0
.
1
7
)
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
G
a
i
n
s
T
a
x
(
+
1
)
0
.
9
1
∗
∗
0
.
4
6
∗
(
0
.
4
1
)
(
0
.
2
7
)
M
o
d
e
l
F
E
O
L
S
O
L
S
F
E
O
L
S
O
L
S
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
5
7
2
2
1
5
4
7
8
0
2
6
3
2
8
5
2
0
3
7
5
1
0
1
7
2
4
6
2
3
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a
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l
e
1
5
:
C
h
a
n
g
i
n
g
t
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
i
n
g
s
c
h
e
m
e
:
T
h
e
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
t
a
x
e
s
o
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
s
t
r
o
u
n
d
W
e
r
e
p
e
a
t
t
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
c
h
a
n
g
e
t
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
i
n
g
s
c
h
e
m
e
.
I
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
s
t
t
h
r
e
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
w
e
s
h
o
w
u
n
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
I
n
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
4
)
a
n
d
(
5
)
w
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
o
u
r
s
a
m
p
l
e
t
o
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
i
t
h
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
1
0
a
n
d
2
0
n
e
w
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
p
e
r
t
e
n
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
i
n
h
a
b
i
t
a
n
t
s
o
n
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
r
e
c
e
i
v
i
n
g
t
h
e
i
r
ﬁ
r
s
t
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
.
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
#
F
i
r
m
s
%
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
#
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
%
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
%
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
L
a
g
g
e
d
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
G
a
i
n
s
T
a
x
-
1
.
1
0
∗
∗
0
.
3
8
-
0
.
2
0
1
.
2
3
2
.
2
3
∗
∗
(
0
.
4
4
)
(
0
.
5
5
)
(
0
.
1
3
)
(
0
.
9
6
)
(
0
.
9
3
)
M
o
d
e
l
u
n
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
u
n
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
u
n
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
>
1
0
>
2
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
3
2
1
2
9
0
3
2
1
2
0
9
1
5
0
T
a
b
l
e
1
6
:
L
e
a
v
i
n
g
o
u
t
t
h
e
e
x
i
t
s
:
T
h
e
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
f
t
a
x
e
s
o
n
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
r
o
u
n
d
s
W
e
r
e
p
e
a
t
t
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
c
h
a
n
g
e
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
m
e
t
h
o
d
t
o
r
a
n
d
o
m
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
.
(
1
)
(
2
)
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
G
a
i
n
s
T
a
x
-
1
.
2
5
∗
∗
∗
-
2
.
0
5
∗
∗
∗
(
0
.
3
8
)
(
0
.
3
3
)
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
G
a
i
n
s
T
a
x
1
.
0
5
∗
∗
∗
(
0
.
2
2
)
Y
e
a
r
F
i
x
e
d
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
S
t
a
g
e
F
i
x
e
d
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
R
o
u
n
d
F
i
x
e
d
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
Y
e
s
N
o
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
F
i
x
e
d
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
F
i
x
e
d
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
F
i
r
m
F
i
x
e
d
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
N
o
N
o
M
o
d
e
l
R
E
R
E
A
d
j
.
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
5
8
2
2
8
5
5
6
1
4
32